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ABSTRACT
In the rare-disasters setting, a key determinant of the equity premium is the size distribution of macroeconomic
disasters, gauged by proportionate declines in per capita consumption or GDP.  The long-term national-accounts
data for up to 36 countries provide a large sample of disaster events of magnitude 10% or more.  For
this sample, a power-law density provides a good fit to the distribution of the ratio of normal to disaster
consumption or GDP.  The key parameter of the size distribution is the upper-tail exponent, ￿, estimated
to be near 5, with a 95% confidence interval between 3-1/2 and 7.  The equity premium involves a
race between ￿ and the coefficient of relative risk aversion, ￿.  A higher ￿ signifies a thinner tail and,
therefore, a lower equity premium, whereas a higher ￿ implies a higher equity premium.  The equity
premium is finite if ￿ 1>￿.  To accord with the observed average unlevered equity premium of around












tjin@fas.harvard.edu  Recent research builds on the rare-disasters idea of Rietz (1988) to explain the long-term 
average equity premium (Barro [2006], Barro and Ursua [2008]).  For a sample of 17 countries 
with long-term data on returns on stocks and short-term government bills, the average annual 
real rates of return were 0.081 on stocks and 0.008 on bills (Barro and Ursua [2008, Table 5]).  
Thus, if the average real bill return is taken as an approximation to the risk-free rate, the average 
observed equity premium was 0.073.  (Since the real bill return is somewhat risky, the risk-free 
rate likely lies below the average real rate of return on bills, and the equity premium would be 
somewhat larger than 0.073.)  An adjustment for typical leverage in corporate financial structure 
(using a debt-equity ratio of 0.5) implied that the corresponding unlevered equity premium was 
around 0.05. 
  Previous research (Barro and Ursua [2008]) sought to explain an average unlevered 
equity premium of 5% within a simple representative-agent model calibrated to accord with the 
long-term history of macroeconomic disasters observed for up to 36 countries.  One element in 
the calibration was the disaster probability, p, measured by the frequency of macroeconomic 
contractions with magnitude of 10% or more.  Another feature of the calibration was the size 
distribution of disasters, gauged by the observed histogram in the range of 10% and above.   
Given the value of p and the size distribution, a coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ, of around 
3.5 was needed to accord with the target equity premium. 
  The present study shows that the size distribution of macroeconomic disasters can be 
characterized empirically by a power law in which the upper-tail exponent is the key parameter.  
Estimates of the power-law parameters replace the observed histogram in the calibration of the 
model.  This procedure allows for new estimates of γ; that is, for the coefficient of relative risk 2 
 
aversion needed to match the target equity premium.  The confidence intervals for the estimates 
of γ correspond to the confidence sets for the power-law parameters. 
  Section I reviews the determination of the equity premium in a simple representative-
agent model with rare disasters.  Section II specifies a familiar, single power law to describe the 
size distribution of disasters and applies the results to estimate the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion, γ.  Section III generalizes to a double power law to get a better fit to the observed size 
distribution of disasters—and, thereby, more reliable estimates of γ.  Sections IV-VI show that 
the results are robust to reasonable variations in the disaster probability, p, the target equity 
premium, and the assumed threshold size for disasters (set initially at 0.10).  Section VII 
summarizes the principal findings, with emphasis on the estimates of γ. 
 
I.  The Equity Premium in a Model with Rare Disasters 
  Barro (2009) works out the equity premium in a Lucas (1978)-tree model that 
incorporates rare but large macroeconomic disasters.  (Results for the equity premium are similar 
in a model with a linear [AK] technology—this framework allows for endogenous saving and 
investment.)  In the Lucas-tree setting, real GDP, Yt, and consumption, Ct=Yt , evolve as 
 (1)   log(Yt+1) = log(Yt) + g + ut+1 + vt+1. 
The parameter g≥0 is a constant that reflects exogenous productivity growth.  The random term 
ut+1, which is i.i.d. normal with mean 0 and variance σ
2, reflects “normal” economic fluctuations.  
The random term vt+1 picks up low-probability disasters, as in Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006).  In 
these rare events, output and consumption jump down sharply.  The probability of a disaster is 3 
 
the constant p≥0 per unit of time.  In a disaster, output contracts by the fraction b, where 0<b<1.
1  
The distribution of vt+1 is given by 
   probability  1-p:    vt+1 = 0, 
   probability  p:    vt+1 = log(1-b). 
The disaster size, b, follows some probability density function.  In previous research, this density 
was gauged by the empirical distribution (histogram) of observed disaster sizes.  The present 
analysis specifies the form of this distribution—as a power law—and estimates the key 
parameters of this distribution, including especially the exponent of the upper tail. 
  Barro (2009) shows that, with a representative agent with Epstein-Zin (1989)-Weil 
(1990) preferences, the formula for the unlevered equity premium is (when the period length 
approaches zero): 






e is the expected rate of return on unlevered equity, r
f is the risk-free rate, E is the 
expectations operator, and γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.  The term in curly 
brackets has a straightforward interpretation under power utility, where γ equals the reciprocal of 
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) for consumption.  Then this term is the product 
of the proportionate decline in equity value during a disaster, b, and the excess of marginal utility 
of consumption in a disaster state compared to that in a normal state, (1-b)
-γ-1.  Note that, in the 
present setting (with constant values of g, σ, p, and the distribution of b), the proportionate fall in 
                                                 
1In this specification, disasters and normal fluctuations have permanent effects on the level of output.  Barro, 
Nakamura, Steinsson, and Ursua (2009) generalize to allow for recoveries from disasters; that is, for periods of 
abnormally high growth following large contractions. 4 
 
equity value during a disaster, b, equals the proportionate fall in GDP and consumption during 
the disaster. 
  Equation (2) can also be expressed as 





1-γ – Eb]. 
Equation (3) shows that the key properties of the distribution of b are the expectations of the 
variable 1/(1-b) taken to the powers γ and γ-1.  (The Eb term has a minor impact.)  Note that 
1/(1-b) is the ratio of consumption in a normal state to that in a disaster state. 
  Barro and Ursua (2008) computed values of b using long-term annual data for real per 
capita consumer expenditure, C, for 24 countries and real per capita GDP, Y, for 36 countries.  
Time periods went back at least to 1914 and as far back as 1870, depending on the availability of 
data.  The end date was 2006.  These data, including sources, are available at 
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data_sets_barro. 
  Proportionate contractions were computed from peak to trough over periods of one or 
more years, and contractions, b, of size 0.10 or greater were considered.
2  This method yielded 
95 disasters for C and 152 for Y.  We use here an updated version of this calculation to isolate 99 
disasters for C (for 24 countries) and 157 for Y (36 countries).  Figure 1a shows the resulting 
histogram for disaster sizes based on C, while Figure 1b shows the comparable diagram for Y.  
The average disaster sizes, subject to the threshold of 0.10, were similar for the two measures—
0.215 for C and 0.204 for Y. 
                                                 
2Operationally, the threshold for b was 0.0950; that is, 0.10 to two decimal places. 5 
 
  The disaster probability, p, was computed as the ratio of the number of disasters to the 
number of non-disaster years.  This calculation yields similar estimates for the two cases—
p=0.0380 per year for C and 0.0383 for Y.  Thus, disasters (macroeconomic contractions of 10% 
or more) typically occur around three times per century.  The U.S. experience for C is 
comparatively mild, featuring only two contractions of size 0.10 or more over 137 years—with 
troughs in 1921 and 1933.  However, for Y, the U.S. data show five contractions of size 0.10 or 
more, with troughs in 1908, 1914, 1921, 1933, and 1947.
3 
  The earlier procedure used the observed histograms for b from the C and Y data 
(Figures 1a and 1b) to compute the expectation (that is, the sample average) of the expression in 
brackets on the right side of equation (3) for various values of the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion, γ.  The resulting values were multiplied by the estimated values of p to calculate the 
disaster term on the right-hand side of the equation.  The other term on the right-hand side, γσ
2, 
was computed under the assumption σ=0.02 per year.  However, as in Mehra and Prescott 
(1985), this term is trivial, compared to the observed equity premium of around 0.05, for 
plausible values of γ (even if we assume higher, but still reasonable, values of σ).  Thus, the 
disaster term ends up doing almost all the work in explaining the equity premium.  A key finding 
in Barro and Ursua (2008, Tables 10 and 11) is that a value for γ around 3.5 was needed to get 
the model’s equity premium into the neighborhood of the target value of 0.05. 
  One shortcoming of the previous methodology is that it sets to zero the probability of 
ever seeing a disaster of size greater than the largest one observed within sample.  This 
restriction matters because the chance—even if small—of experiencing an extremely large 
                                                 
3The 1947 GDP contraction was associated with the demobilization after WWII and did not involve a decline in C.  
The 1908 and 1914 GDP contractions featured declines in C but not up to the threshold of 0.10. 6 
 
disaster has a significant impact on the model’s predicted equity premium.  That is, the large 
values of b in the tail of the histograms in Figures 1a and 1b count disproportionately in 
equations (2) and (3) when γ is well above one.  A second point is that the previous analysis was 
able to calculate an interval of values of γ that would generate a satisfactory equity premium 
(around 0.05) but could not compute a confidence interval for γ.  The present analysis allows for 
the construction of these confidence intervals. 
 
II.  Single Power-Law Distribution 
  In what follows, we work with the transformed disaster size 
 ( 4 )      z   ≡ 1/(1-b), 
which is the ratio of normal to disaster consumption or GDP.  Note that this variable appears in 
the formulas for the equity premium in equation (3).  The threshold for b of 0.095 (see n.2) 
translates into a threshold for z of z0=1.105.  As b approaches 1 (its largest possible value), z 
approaches infinity.  This limiting property for z accords with the usual setting for a power-law 
distribution.  The histograms for the transformed disaster size, z, are shown in Figures 2a and 2b 
for C and GDP, respectively. 
  We start with a familiar, single power law, which specifies the density function as 
 ( 5 )      f ( z )   =   A z
-α, 
for z ≥ z0, where A>0 and α>1.  The condition that the density integrate to 1 over the interval 
from z0 to ∞ implies 7 
 
 ( 6 )      A   =   ( α-1)·z0
α-1 . 
The key parameter that describes the power-law density is the exponent α>1. 
  The power-law distribution, given in equation (5), has been applied widely in physics, 
economics, computer science, ecology, biology, astronomy, and so on.  For a review, see 
Mitzenmacher (2003a).  Gabaix (2009) presents numerous examples of power laws in economics 
and finance and discusses forces that can generate these laws.  The examples include sizes of 
cities (Gabaix and Ioannides [2004]), stock-market activity (Gabaix, et al. [2003, 2006]), CEO 
compensation (Gabaix and Landier [2008]), and firm size (Luttmer [2007]).  Because of its many 
applications, the power-law distribution has been given many names, including heavy-tail 
distribution, Pareto distribution, Zipfian distribution, and fractal distribution.    
  In the late 19
th century, the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto observed that, for large 
populations, a graph of the logarithm of the number of incomes above a level x against the 
logarithm of x yielded points sitting close to a straight line with a slope that we call –α′ (Pareto 
[1897]). This property corresponds to a density proportional to x
−α′−1; hence, α in equation (5) 
corresponds to α′+1.  The straight-line property exhibited in a log-log graph can be used to 
estimate the exponent α; see, for example, Gabaix and Ibragimov (2009), who use a least-squares 
approach.  A more common method to estimate α is maximum likelihood or MLE—see, for 
example, Howell (2004) and Bauke (2007).  We use MLE in our study. 
  In some applications, such as the distribution of income, the power law gives a poor fit to 
the observed frequency data over the whole range but provides a good fit to the upper tail.
4  In 
                                                 
4 There have been many attempts to explain this Paretian tail behavior, including Champernowne (1953), 
Mandelbrot (1960), and Reed (2003). 8 
 
many of these cases, a double power law—which allows for two different exponents over two 
ranges of the variable z—fits the data well.  For uses of this method, see, for example, Reed 
(2003) on the distribution of income, Mitzenmacher (2003b) on computer file sizes, and 
Yamamoto and Ohtsuki (2008) on “aggregation-chipping processes.”  The double power-law 
specification requires the estimation of a cutoff value, δ, for the variable z, above which the 
upper-tail exponent, α, for the usual power law applies.  In our rare-disasters context, we 
ultimately adopt this double power-law approach.  However, for expository purposes, we begin 
with the standard single power law.  Problems in fitting aspects of the data eventually motivate 
us to shift to the richer specification. 
  The single power-law density in equations (5) and (6) implies that the equity premium in 
equation (3) is given by 
 (7)   r
e - r
f = γσ
2 +  ·   
   
         
    
   
       
      
   
   · 
 
  
  1    
if α-1>γ.  For given p and z0, the disaster term on the right-hand side involves a race between γ, 
the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and α, the tail exponent for the disaster-size density 
function.  An increase in γ raises the disaster term.  A rise in α implies a thinner tail and, 
therefore, a smaller disaster term.  If α-1≤γ, the tail is sufficiently thick that the equity premium 
is infinite. This result corresponds to a risk-free rate, r
f, of -∞.  The formula in equation (7) 
applies when α-1>γ. 
  The outcome with an infinite equity premium resembles findings highlighted by 
Weitzman (2007).  In his framework, sufficient uncertainty about the parameters of the shock 
distribution can lead to an infinite equity premium, corresponding to a risk-free rate, r
f, of -∞.  
However, our assumption is that the left-hand side of equation (7) takes on a known, finite value, 9 
 
which we take to be 0.05.  Therefore, the maximum-likelihood estimates will satisfy the 
condition α-1≤γ, so that r
e-r
f is finite in the model (as it is in the data).  For our purposes, the 
critical point is not that r
e-r
f takes on a known, fixed value, such as 0.05.  Rather, the important 
property is that we know that r
e-r
f is substantially positive—greater than, say, 0.03 for sure—but 
not astronomical—less than, say, 0.07 for sure. 
  We turn now to estimation of the tail exponent, α.  When equation (5) applies, the log 
likelihood for N observations on z (all at least as large as the threshold, z0) is given by 
  (8)  log(L) = N·[(α-1)·log(z0) + log(α-1)] – α·[log(z1) + … + log(zN)], 
where we used the condition for the constant A given in equation (6).  The MLE for α follows 
readily as 
 (9)   1/(α-1) = log(z1/z0) + … + log(zN/z0). 
We obtained standard errors and 95% confidence intervals for the estimate of α from the 
percentile bootstrap method.
5 
  Table 1 shows that the point estimate of α for the 99 C disasters is 7.27, with a standard 
error of 0.81 and a 95% confidence interval of (5.96, 9.12).  Results based on the 157 GDP 
disasters are similar:  the point estimate of α is 7.86, with a standard error of 0.76 and a 95% 
confidence interval of (6.56, 9.48).   
  Given an estimate for α—and given the values σ=0.02, z0=1.105, and a value for p 
(0.0380 for C and 0.0383 for Y)—we need only a value for γ in equation (7) to determine the 
                                                 
5See Efron and Tibshirani (1993).  Results are similar using the adjusted (BC_a) method proposed by Efron (1987).  
We also get similar results based on -2·log(likelihood ratio) being distributed asymptotically as a chi-squared 
distribution with one degree of freedom.  See Greene (2002) for a discussion of this likelihood-ratio approach. 10 
 
model’s predicted equity premium, r
e-r
f.  To put it another way, we can find the value of γ 
needed to generate r
e-r
f=0.05 for each specified value of α.  (Note that the resulting γ has to 
satisfy the condition γ<α -1—in order for r
e-r
f to be finite in equation [7].)  For example, the 
point estimate for α of 7.27 from the C data requires the value γ=3.97 to generate r
e-r
f = 0.05.  
Similarly, the standard errors and confidence intervals for α translate into standard errors and 
confidence intervals for γ.   
  Table 1 shows the resulting estimates of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ.  For 
the C data, the point estimate is 3.97, with a standard error of 0.51 and a 95% confidence interval 
of (3.13, 5.13).  For the GDP data, the point estimate is 4.33, with a standard error of 0.48 and a 
95% confidence interval of (3.50, 5.33). 
  The results from the single power law suggest that the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion, γ, likely lies between 3 and 5-1/2 in order to accord with the target equity premium of 
0.05.  By way of comparison, the previous results that used the histograms for C and GDP 
disasters (Barro and Ursua [2008, Tables 10 and 11]) indicated that a value of γ in the vicinity of 
3.5 was needed to generate an equity premium of 0.05.  Thus, the single power-law results 
suggest somewhat higher estimates of γ.  This result is contrary to our expectations, because we 
anticipated that the shift to a parameterized distribution would allow for the possibility of 
disasters higher than any realized within sample and, thereby, lower the value of γ required to fit 
the observed average equity premium.  We think that this conflict between results and 
expectations reflects shortcomings in the single power-law specification. 
  Figure 3a compares the observed histogram for the C disasters with the frequency 
distribution implied by the single power law in equations (5) and (6), using the value α=7.27 11 
 
(from Table 1), along with z0=1.105.  Figure 3b gives the parallel information for the GDP 
disasters, using the value α=7.86 (from Table 1), along with z0=1.105.  The vertical axes in 
Figures 3a and 3b show the distribution densities.  For the empirical histograms, multiplication 
of the bin heights shown on the vertical axis by the bin width of 0.04 gives the fraction of the 
total observations that fall into each bin.  An important inference from the figures is that the 
single power laws particularly underestimate the frequency of large disasters. 
  The failures in the single power laws can be seen more clearly in diagrams that assess 
cumulative densities.  The red lines in Figures 4a and 4b show, for C and GDP, respectively, 
fitted logs of probabilities based on the single power laws that transformed disaster sizes exceed 
the values shown on the horizontal axes.  The blue lines connecting the points show logs of 
normalized ranks of disaster sizes (discussed in Gabaix and Ibragimov [2009]).  If the specified 
form of the power law is valid, then the two graphs shown in each figure should be close to each 
other over the full range of z.  However, the figures demonstrate that the single power laws 
substantially underestimate the probabilities of being far out in the upper tails. 
  One way to account for these discrepancies is that the tail exponent should be lower at 
high disaster sizes.  A tractable way to accord with this pattern is to generalize to a double power 
law.  This new form specifies an upper-tail exponent, α, that applies for z at or above some cutoff 
value, δ≥z0, and a lower-tail exponent, β, that applies below the cutoff, that is, for z0 ≤ z <δ.  This 
generalization requires the estimation of three parameters:  the two exponents, α and β, and the 
cutoff, δ.  We still treat the threshold, z0, as known and equal to 1.105.  We consider later the 
implications of a change in the threshold. 
 12 
 
III.  Double Power-Law Distribution 
  The double power-law distribution, with exponents β and α, takes the form:  
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where β, α > 1; A, B > 0; z0 >0 is the known threshold; and δ≥ z0 is the cutoff separating the 
lower and upper parts of the distribution of z.  The conditions that the density integrate to one 
over [z0, ∞) and that the densities be equal just to the left and right of the cutoff, δ, imply 
 (11)     
α β δ
− = A B                                                             
and 

























The single power law in equations (5) and 6), corresponding to β=α, is the special case of the 
double power law in equations (10)-(12) when the cutoff, δ, equals the threshold, z0.           
  The position of the cutoff, δ, determines the number, K, among the total observations, N, 
that lie below the cutoff.  The remaining N-K observations are at or above the cutoff.  Therefore, 
the log likelihood can be expressed as a generalization of equation (8) as: 
  (13)  log(L) = N·log(A) + K·(β-α)·log(δ) – β·[log(z1) + … + log(zK)]  
     –   α·[log(zK+1) + … + log(zN)], 
where A satisfies equation (12).   13 
 
  We use maximum likelihood to determine the point estimates of the three parameters α, 
β, and δ.  One complication is that small changes in the cutoff, δ, cause discrete changes in K 
whenever one or more observations lie just at the cutoff.  These jumps do not translate into 
jumps in log(L) because the density is equal just to the left and right of the cutoff.  However, 
jumps do arise in the derivatives of log(L) with respect to the parameters.  This issue does not 
cause problems in finding numerically the values of (α, β, δ) that maximize log(L) in 
equation (13).  Moreover, it turns out that we get virtually the same answers if we rely on the 
first-order conditions for maximizing log(L) that are calculated while ignoring the jump problem 
related to the cutoff.  (In this approach, the number K is treated as fixed in the computation of the 
first-order conditions for maximizing the likelihood.)  These first-order conditions are 
generalizations of equation (9).
6 
  The upper part of Table 2 shows the point estimates of (α, β, δ) for the C data, and the 
lower part shows the corresponding point estimates for the GDP data.  We again compute 
standard errors and 95% confidence intervals using bootstrap methods. 
  A key finding for C and GDP in Table 2 is that the upper-tail exponent, α, is estimated to 
be much smaller than the lower-tail exponent, β.  For example, for C, the point estimate of α is 
5.16, standard error = 0.87, with a confidence interval of (3.66, 7.14), whereas that for β is 11.10, 
standard error = 2.40, with a confidence interval of (8.37, 16.17).  The estimates reject the 
hypothesis α=β in favor of α<β at a very low p-value (for both C and GDP). 
                                                 
6The expressions are:  
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  The point estimate of the cutoff value, δ, for the C disasters is 1.38—recall that this value 
corresponds to the transformed disaster size, z ≡1/(1-b).  The corresponding cutoff for the 
proportionate macroeconomic contraction, b, is 0.275.  With this cutoff, 77 of the C crises fall 
below the cutoff, whereas 22 are above.  The corresponding cutoff for b with the GDP crises is 
0.320, implying that 136 events fall below the cutoff, whereas 21 are above.  Despite the 
comparatively small number of crises that lie above the cutoffs, we know from previous research 
(Barro and Ursua [2008, Tables 10 and 11]) that these really large crises matter a lot for the 
equity premium.  That assessment still holds for the present analysis. 
  Figure 5a compares the observed histogram for the C disasters with the frequency 
distribution implied by the double power law in equations (10)-(12), using the values α=5.16, 
β=11.10, and δ=1.38 (from Table 2), along with z0=1.105.  Figure 5b provides the analogous 
information for the GDP disasters, using the values α=4.53, β=11.51, and δ=1.47 (from Table 2), 
along with z0=1.105.  Unlike for the single power laws, considered in Figures 3a and 3b, the 
values implied by the double power laws seem to accord well with the observed histograms.  
Figures 6a and 6b provide corresponding information for cumulative densities.  Note that, 
compared with the fits for the single power laws in Figures 4a and 4b, the double power laws 
accord much better with the upper-tail behavior.  These improved fits for the double power laws 
suggest that they would provide a better basis for estimating the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion, γ. 
  With respect to the equity premium, the key difference between the double power laws in 
Table 2 and the single power laws in Table 1 is the substantially smaller values of the upper-tail 
exponents, α.  Since the values of α are now close to 5, rather than exceeding 7, the upper tails 
are much fatter when gauged by the double power laws.  These fatter tails mean, in turn, that a 15 
 
substantially lower coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ, is needed to accord with the target 
equity premium of 0.05. 
  The formula for the equity premium, r
e-r
f, is again given by equation (3).  For a given γ, a 
specification of the parameters (α, β, δ), along with z0=1.105, determines the moments of the 
disaster-size distribution that appear in equation (3).  That is, we get a more complicated version 
of the expression given in equation (7).  (A finite value for r
e-r
f still requires α-1>γ.)  This result 
allows us to determine the point estimates of γ that correspond to the point estimates of (α, β, δ) 
shown in Table 2 (still assuming σ=0.02 and p=0.0380 for C and 0.0383 for GDP).  This 
procedure yields a point estimate for γ of 3.02 from the C disasters and 2.96 from the GDP 
disasters.   
  We can also proceed as before to determine standard errors and 95% confidence intervals 
for the estimates of γ.  The main distribution parameter that affects the estimate of γ is the upper-
tail exponent, α.  However, we allow also for variations in β and δ in determining standard errors 
and confidence intervals for γ.  The result is that, for the C disasters, the point estimate for γ of 
3.02 has a standard error of 0.52, with a 95% confidence interval of (2.16, 4.15).  For the GDP 
disasters, the point estimate for γ of 2.96 has a standard error of 0.56, with a confidence interval 
of (2.04, 4.21).  Thus, γ is estimated to be close to 3, with a 95% confidence band of roughly 2 
to 4. 
  Because of the fatter upper tails with the double power laws, the estimated values of γ are 
well below those estimated from the single power laws (Table 1).  Moreover, as we anticipated, 
the estimated values of γ—centered around 3—are noticeably lower than the value 3.5 implied 
by the observed histograms of disaster sizes (Barro and Ursua [2008, Tables 10 and 11]).  The 16 
 
main reason is that the double power law, with an upper-tail exponent, α, around 5, gives some 
weight to outcomes worse than any experienced in the history that underlies the histograms for C 
and GDP (Figures 2a and 2b).  Although the probabilities of these outcomes are very small, the 
large size (magnified in impact by a value for γ around 3) leads to a non-negligible effect on the 
equity premium. 
 
IV.  Variations in the Disaster Probability 
  We could, in principle, consider how uncertainty in the estimates of the disaster 
probability, p, affect the estimates of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ.  The estimates of 
p that we used relied on all the sample data, not just the disaster observations.  That is, p equaled 
the ratio of the number of disasters (for C or GDP) to the number of non-disaster years in the full 
sample.  A possible approach to assessing uncertainty about the estimate of p would be to use a 
model that incorporates all of the data, not just the disaster realizations, along the lines of Barro, 
Nakamura, Steinsson, and Ursua (2009).  We could also consider a richer model in which p 
varies over time, along the lines of Gabaix (2008). 
  We carry out here a more limited analysis that assesses how “reasonable” variations in p 
influence the point estimates and confidence intervals for γ.
7  Figure 7a gives the results for C, 
and Figure 7b has the results for GDP.   In Figure 7a, the baseline value for p of 0.038 led to a 
point estimate for γ of 3.00, with a 95% confidence interval of (2.16, 4.15).  We can see from the 
figure that lowering p by a full percentage point (to 0.028) increases the point estimate of γ to 
                                                 
7Note that, for a given set of observed disaster sizes (for C or GDP), differences in p do not affect the maximum-
likelihood estimates for the parameters of the power-law distributions.  We can think of differences in p as arising 
from changes in the overall sample size while holding fixed the realizations of the number and sizes of disaster 
events.  17 
 
only 3.2, whereas raising p by a full percentage point (to 0.048) decreases the point estimate of γ 
to only 2.8.  Figure 7b shows that similar conclusions emerge from the GDP data.  In this case, 
the point estimate of γ goes from 2.75 at the baseline p of 0.038 to 2.9 when p=0.028 and 2.6 
when p=0.048.  Thus, allowing for substantial uncertainty in the estimates of p has only a 
moderate impact on the point estimates and confidence intervals for γ. 
 
V.  Variations in the Target Equity Premium 
  Our analysis assumed a known and fixed value of the target (unlevered) equity premium, 
0.05.  More realistically, there is uncertainty about the true value of this equity premium and, in a 
richer model, the premium can vary over time and space (due, for example, to shifts in the 
disaster probability, p).  As with variations in p in the previous section, we consider here how 
reasonable variations in the target equity premium influence the point estimates and confidence 
intervals for the coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ. 
  Equation (3) shows that variations in the equity premium, r
e–r
f, on the left-hand side are 
essentially equivalent, but with the opposite sign, to variations in p on the right-hand side.  
Therefore, diagrams for estimates of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ, versus r
e–r
f look 
similar to Figures 7a and 7b, except that the slopes are now positive.  That is, a higher target 
equity premium requires a higher γ.  Quantitatively, for the C data, if r
e–r
f were 0.04, rather than 
0.05, the point estimate of γ would be 2.8, rather than 3.0.  On the other side, if r
e–r
f were 0.06, 
the point estimate of γ would be 3.2.  Results with the GDP data are similar.  Thus, the overall 
conclusions are similar to those concerning variations in p.    
 18 
 
VI.  Alternative Thresholds 
  The results obtained, thus far, apply for a fixed threshold of z0=1.105, corresponding to 
proportionate contractions, b, of size 0.10 or greater.  This specification of the threshold is 
arbitrary.  In fact, our estimation of the cutoff value, δ, for the double power law in Table 2 
amounts to endogenizing the threshold that applies to the upper-tail part of the distribution.  We 
were able to estimate δ by MLE because we included in the sample a group of observations that 
potentially fell below the cutoff.  Similarly, to estimate the threshold, z0, we would have to 
include data that potentially lie below the threshold.  As with estimates of p, this extension 
requires consideration of all (or at least more of) the sample data, not just the disaster 
observations (with sizes above the designated threshold). 
  We carry out here a limited analysis that assesses the impact of variations in the threshold 
on the estimated parameters of the power-law distributions (α for the single power law and α, β, 
and δ for the double power law).  Most importantly, we assess the effects on the estimated 
coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ.  We consider a substantial increase in the threshold, z0, to 
1.170, corresponding to b =0.15 (the value used in Barro [2006]).
8  This rise in the threshold 
implies a corresponding fall in the disaster probability, p (gauged still by the ratio of the number 
of disasters to the number of non-disaster years in the full sample).  For the C data, the number 
of disasters declines from 99 to 62, and p decreases from 0.0380 to 0.0225.  For the GDP data, 
the number of disasters falls from 157 to 91, and p declines from 0.0383 to 0.0209.
9  That is, the 
probability of a disaster of size 0.15 or more is about 2% per year, corresponding to roughly 2 
events per century. 
                                                 
8More precisely, we use a value of 0.145, corresponding to 0.15 to two decimal places. 
9The variations in p and the number of disasters do not precisely correspond because a shift in the threshold affects 
the number of non-disaster years in the full sample.  19 
 
  For the single power law, the new results in Table 3 (with a threshold of z0=1.170) can be 
compared with the initial findings in Table 1 (where z0=1.105).  The rise in the threshold causes 
the estimated exponent, α, to adjust toward the value estimated before for the upper part of the 
double power law (Table 2).  Since the upper-tail exponents (α) were lower than the lower-tail 
exponents (β), the estimated α for a single power law tends to fall when the threshold rises.  For 
the C data, the point estimate of α decreases from 7.3 in Table 1 to 6.5 in Table 3.  For GDP, the 
estimated α declines from 7.9 in Table 1 to 6.7 in Table 3.  In each case, the confidence intervals 
for α shift downward accordingly. 
  The reductions in α imply a thickening of the upper tail of the size distribution for 
disasters and lead, thereby, to lower estimates of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ 
(needed to accord with the target equity premium of 0.05).  For the C data, the estimated γ 
declines from 4.0 in Table 1 to 3.7 in Table 3.  Similarly, with the GDP data, the value falls from 
4.3 in Table 1 to 3.9 in Table 3.  The confidence intervals for γ shift downward 
correspondingly.
10 
  With a double power law, the change in the threshold has less of an impact on the 
estimates of the upper-tail exponent, α, which is the key parameter that affects the estimates of 
the coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ.  For the C data, the rise in the threshold moves the 
estimated α from 5.16 in Table 2 to 5.05 in Table 4.  The confidence intervals for α change 
                                                 
10These results apply even though the higher threshold reduces the disaster probability, p.  That is, disaster sizes in 
the range between 0.10 and 0.15 no longer count.  As in Barro and Ursua (2008, Tables 10 and 11), the elimination 
of these comparatively small disasters has only a minor impact on the model’s computed equity premium and, 
hence, on the value of γ required to generate the target premium of 0.05.  The more important force is the thickening 
of the upper tail implied by the reduction of the tail exponent, α. 20 
 
correspondingly little.
11  These results imply that the results for γ also change little, going from a 
point estimate of 3.00 with a confidence interval of (2.16, 4.15) in Table 2 to 3.00 with an 
interval of (2.21, 4.29) in Table 4.  Figure 8a describes how the estimates of γ depend on the 
disaster probability, p, with the higher threshold for the C data. 
  For the GDP data, the changes from a rise in the threshold are somewhat harder to 
interpret.  The estimated α goes from 4.53 with a confidence interval of (3.39, 7.07) in Table 2 to 
5.77 with an interval of (3.42, 7.24) in Table 4.  Thus, the confidence interval hardly changes, 
but the point estimate shifts substantially.
12  The apparent discrepancies in the results arise 
because the point estimates are not close to the midpoints of the confidence intervals (falling 
below the center in the first case and above in the second).  The main information is in the 
confidence intervals, not the point estimates. 
 Similarly,  for  γ, the estimate goes from 2.75 with a confidence interval of (2.04, 4.21) in 
Table 2 to 3.41 with an interval of (2.04, 4.34) in Table 4.  Again, the confidence interval barely 
changes, but the point estimate shifts noticeably.  Figure 8b describes how the estimates of γ 
depend on the disaster probability, p, with the higher threshold for the GDP data. 
  We think that the important result from the C and GDP data is that the confidence 
intervals for α and γ change little when the threshold rises substantially.  Thus, the main message 
is that a substantial increase in the threshold has only a minor effect on the principal findings 
about the degree of risk aversion. 
 
                                                 
11Note, however, that the rise in the threshold dramatically widens the confidence interval for the estimate of the 
lower-tail exponent, β.  As the threshold rises toward the previously estimated cutoff value, δ, the lower tail of the 
size distribution becomes less relevant. 
12Again, the confidence interval for the lower-tail exponent, β, widens sharply when the threshold rises. 21 
 
VII.  Summary of Main Findings 
  The coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ, is a key parameter for analyses of behavior 
toward risk.  We estimate γ by combining information on the frequency and sizes of 
macroeconomic disasters with the observed long-term average equity premium.  Specifically, we 
figure out what γ has to be to accord with a target unlevered equity premium of 5% per year 
within a simple representative-agent model that allows for rare disasters. 
  In our main calibration, based on the long-term global history of macroeconomic 
depressions, the probability, p, of disaster (defined as a contraction in per capita consumption or 
GDP by at least 10% over a short period) is 3.8% per year.  The size distribution of disasters 
accords well with a double power-law density, with an upper-tail exponent, α, estimated to be 
around five.  The resulting point estimate of the key preference parameter γ is close to three, with 
a 95% confidence interval ranging from two to four.  This basic finding is robust to whether we 
consider contractions of consumer expenditure or GDP and to substantial variations in the 
disaster probability, p, the target equity premium (set initially at 0.05), and the threshold value 
for the size distribution. 




Single Power Law, Estimates of α and γ  







C data (99 disasters) 
α  7.27 0.81 (5.96,  9.12) 
γ  3.97 0.51 (3.13,  5.13) 
GDP data (157 disasters) 
α  7.86 0.76 (6.56,  9.48) 
γ  4.33 0.48 (3.50,  5.33) 
 
 
Note:  The single power law, given by equations (5) and (6), applies to transformed disaster 
sizes, z≡1/(1-b), where b is the proportionate decline in C (real personal consumer expenditure 
per capita) or real GDP (per capita).  Disasters are all at least as large as the threshold, z0=1.105 
(corresponding to b≥0.095).  The table shows the maximum-likelihood estimate of the tail 
exponent, α.  The standard error and 95% confidence interval come from the percentile bootstrap 
method.  The corresponding estimates of γ, the coefficient of relative risk aversion, come from 
calculating the values needed to generate an unlevered equity premium of 0.05 in equation (7) 
(assuming σ=0.02 and p=0.0380 for C and 0.0383 for GDP). 




Double Power Law, Estimates of α, β, δ, and γ 







C data (99 disasters) 
α  5.16 0.87 (3.66,  7.14) 
β  11.10 2.40 (8.37,  16.17) 
δ  1.38 0.13 (1.24,  1.77) 
γ  3.00 0.52 (2.16,  4.15) 
GDP data (157 disasters) 
α  4.53 0.97 (3.39,  7.07) 
β  11.51 3.81 (9.67,  21.98) 
δ  1.47 0.15 (1.21,  1.69) 
γ  2.75 0.56 (2.04,  4.21) 
 
 
Note:  The double power law, given by equations (10)-(12), applies to transformed disaster sizes, 
z≡1/(1-b), where b is the proportionate decline in C (real personal consumer expenditure per 
capita) or real GDP (per capita).  Disasters are all at least as large as the threshold, z0=1.105 
(corresponding to b≥0.095).  The table shows the maximum-likelihood estimates of the two 
exponents, α (above the cutoff) and β (below the cutoff), and the cutoff value, δ.  The standard 
errors and 95% confidence intervals come from the percentile bootstrap method.  The 
corresponding estimates of γ, the coefficient of relative risk aversion, come from calculating the 
values needed to generate an unlevered equity premium of 0.05 in equation (7) (assuming σ=0.02 
and p=0.0380 for C and 0.0383 for GDP). 




Single Power Law, Estimates of α and γ  







C data (62 disasters) 
α  6.53 0.85 (5.16,  8.61) 
γ  3.71 0.53 (2.83,  4.97) 
GDP data (91 disasters) 
α  6.67 0.81 (5.39,  8.49) 
γ  3.86 0.51 (3.03,  4.99) 
 
 
Note:  See the notes to Table 1.  Disasters are now all at least as large as the threshold z0=1.170, 
corresponding to b>0.145.  The disaster probability, p, is now 0.0225 for C and 0.0209 for GDP. 




Double Power Law, Estimates of α, β, δ, and γ 







C data (62 disasters) 
α  5.05 0.87 (3.81,  7.12) 
β  12.36 8.27 (7.63,  40.78) 
δ  1.37 0.15 (1.21,  1.86) 
γ  3.00 0.54 (2.21,  4.29) 
GDP data (91 disasters) 
α  5.77 1.00 (3.42,  7.24) 
β  60.22 22.13 (8.90,  77.73) 
δ  1.20 0.17 (1.20,  1.75) 
γ  3.41 0.60 (2.04,  4.34) 
 
 
Note:  See the notes to Table 2.  Disasters are now all at least as large as the threshold z0=1.170, 












Note:  The threshold is b=0.095. 
  












Histogram of Consumption Disaster Sizes
Consumption Disaster Size b






















Note:  The threshold is b=0.095. 
 
  







Histogram of GDP Disaster Sizes
GDP Disaster Size b























Note:  The threshold is z0=1.105, corresponding to b=0.095. 
 
  







Histogram of Transformed C Disaster Sizes (z
0 = 1.105)
Transformed C Disaster Size z ( = 1/(1-b))























Note:  The threshold is z0=1.105, corresponding to b=0.095. 
 
  












Histogram of Transformed GDP Disaster Sizes (z
0 = 1.105)
Transformed GDP Disaster Size z ( = 1/(1-b))






















Note:  The results for the single power law for C correspond to Table 1.  For the histogram, 
multiplication of the bin height shown on the vertical axis by the bin width of 0.04 gives the 
fraction of the total observations (99) that fall into the indicated bin. 
  






























Histogram of Empirical Density of Transformed C Disasters




Empirical Density of Transformed Disaster Sizes (Width of Bin = 0.04)






Note:  The results for the single power law for GDP correspond to Table 1.  For the histogram, 
multiplication of the bin height shown on the vertical axis by the bin width of 0.04 gives the 
fraction of the total observations (157) that fall into the indicated bin. 
 
  
































Histogram of Empirical Density of Transformed GDP Disasters




Empirical Density of Transformed Disaster Sizes (Width of Bin = 0.04)







Note:  The red line shows the log of the probability that the transformed disaster size, z, exceeds 
the quantity shown on the horizontal axis.  This line comes from the estimated single power law 
for C shown in Table 1.  The blue line connecting the points, based on the log of the transformed 
ranks of the disaster sizes, should (if the estimated power law is valid) converge point-wise in 
probability to the log of the probability given by the red line (see Gabaix and Ibragimov [2009]).  











Log of Transformed Disaster Sizes (log(z) ∈ [log(z
0), log(4)])








































































Log C Disaster Sizes vs log[(Rank - 1/2)/(N - 1/2)] & Estimated Distribution Function (Log Scale)











Note:  The red line shows the log of the probability that the transformed disaster size, z, exceeds 
the quantity shown on the horizontal axis.  This line comes from the estimated single power law 
for GDP shown in Table 1.  The blue line connecting the points, based on the log of the 
transformed ranks of the disaster sizes, should (if the estimated power law is valid) converge 
point-wise in probability to the log of the probability given by the red line (see Gabaix and 
Ibragimov [2009]).    











Log of Transformed Disaster Sizes (log(z) ∈ [log(z
0), log(4)])








































































Log GDP Disaster Sizes vs log[(Rank - 1/2)/(N - 1/2)] & Estimated Distribution Function (Log Scale)











Note:  The results for the double power law for C correspond to Table 2.  For the histogram, 
multiplication of the bin height shown on the vertical axis by the bin width of 0.04 gives the 
fraction of the total observations (99) that fall into the indicated bin. 
 
  
































Histogram of Empirical Density of Transformed C Disasters




Empirical Density of Transformed Disaster Sizes (Width of Bin = 0.04)






Note:  The results for the double power law for GDP correspond to Table 2.  For the histogram, 
multiplication of the bin height shown on the vertical axis by the bin width of 0.04 gives the 
fraction of the total observations (157) that fall into the indicated bin. 
  

































Histogram of Empirical Density of Transformed GDP Disasters




Empirical Density of Transformed Disaster Sizes (Width of Bin = 0.04)





Note:  The red line shows the log of the probability that the transformed disaster size, z, exceeds 
the quantity shown on the horizontal axis.  This line comes from the estimated double power law 
for C shown in Table 2.  The blue line connecting the points, based on the log of the transformed 
ranks of the disaster sizes, should (if the estimated power law is valid) converge point-wise in 
probability to the log of the probability given by the red line (see Gabaix and Ibragimov [2009]).  








Log of Transformed Disaster Sizes (log(z) ∈ [log(z
0), log(4)])








































































Log C Disaster Sizes vs log[(Rank - 1/2)/(N - 1/2)] & Estimated Distribution Function (Log Scale)





Log of Distribution Function Estimated by Using Double Power Law






Note:  The red line shows the log of the probability that the transformed disaster size, z, exceeds 
the quantity shown on the horizontal axis.  This line comes from the estimated double power law 
for GDP shown in Table 1.  The blue line connecting the points, based on the log of the 
transformed ranks of the disaster sizes, should (if the estimated power law is valid) converge 
point-wise in probability to the log of the probability given by the red line (see Gabaix and 
Ibragimov [2009]).     








Log of Transformed Disaster Sizes (log(z) ∈ [log(z
0), log(4)])








































































Log GDP Disaster Sizes vs log[(Rank - 1/2)/(N - 1/2)] & Estimated Distribution Function (Log Scale)





Log of Distribution Function Estimated by Using Double Power Law







Estimates of Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion, γ, for Alternative Disaster Probabilities 
Based on C Data with Threshold of z0=1.105 
 
 
Note:  These results correspond to the estimates for the double power law for C, as described in 
Table 2. 
  





















γ as a Function of p and Lower & Upper Bounds by Percentile Method (γ Corresponds to
5% Equity Premium, Parameters Are Estimated from C Data, z
0 = 1.105, σ = 0.020)
 
 
γ as a Function of p
Lower Bound Function by Percentile Method
Upper Bound Function by Percentile Method







Estimates of Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion, γ, for Alternative Disaster Probabilities 
Based on GDP Data with Threshold of z0=1.105 
 
Note:  These results correspond to the estimates for the double power law for GDP, as described 
in Table 2.   





















γ as a Function of p and Lower & Upper Bounds by Percentile Method (γ Corresponds to
5% Equity Premium, Parameters Are Estimated from GDP Data, z
0 = 1.105, σ = 0.020)
 
 
γ as a Function of p
Lower Bound Function by Percentile Method
Upper Bound Function by Percentile Method







Estimates of Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion, γ, for Alternative Disaster Probabilities 
Based on C Data with Threshold of z0=1.170 
 
Note:  These results correspond to the estimates for the double power law for C, as described in 
Table 4. 
  






















γ as a Function of p and Lower & Upper Bounds by Percentile Method (γ Corresponds to
5% Equity Premium, Parameters Are Estimated from C Data, z
0 = 1.170, σ = 0.020)
 
 
γ as a Function of p
Lower Bound Function by Percentile Method
Upper Bound Function by Percentile Method







Estimates of Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion, γ, for Alternative Disaster Probabilities 
Based on GDP Data with Threshold of z0=1.170 
 
Note:  These results correspond to the estimates for the double power law for GDP, as described 
in Table 4. 
  






















γ as a Function of p and Lower & Upper Bounds by Percentile Method (γ Corresponds to
5% Equity Premium, Parameters Are Estimated from GDP Data, z
0 = 1.170, σ = 0.020)
 
 
γ as a Function of p
Lower Bound Function by Percentile Method
Upper Bound Function by Percentile Method
p = 0.0209 (Point Estimate of γ = 3.414, Lower Bound = 2.04, Upper Bound = 4.343)42 
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